800 Points
Anonymous SIM cards make it much more difficult for state actors and other attackers to select their targets. Whether silent text messages, IMSI catchers, inventory data information, traffic data information, radio cell evaluations, source monitoring, state trojans or location surveillance. An anonymous SIM card is often one of the few remaining defenses against such surveillance.

More information

The topic of mobile phone monitoring is complex and cannot be fully covered in this context. However, it is important to understand that security apps cannot do anything about such monitoring, for example because it affects data that is already stored with your provider and not on your phone. Or because the apps themselves do not have access to your phone's proprietary radio chip and therefore cannot see silent text messages, for example. Or because the attack takes place in the wireless network between network providers. Or because your mobile provider simply sells your data on. So relying on apps or changes in behavior won't help. The only defense is anonymous SIM cards. Also bear in mind that over 100 government agencies in Germany can access people's phone numbers and vice versa without a court order.

You can order anonymous sim cards on the Internet. The search engine of your choice will help you. This project deliberately does not want to advertise individual services. Sometimes there is also scam. Please keep in mind that anonymous cards are probably often registered by marginalized groups like migrants to make some money. Many cards are backed by real people who vouch for you with their own name. Therefore, only use the card to protect yourself.

Particularly important for the following target groups:

  • Journalism, criticism of the regime and exile
  • Protests and demonstrations
  • Direct actions

Other categories

  • Important basics
  • Behavior-based risks
  • Location monitoring
  • Dangers in the mobile network
  • Rather more complicated

Sources and further links

  1. Regensburg Regional Court: Radio cell searches also permitted for minor offenses, tarnkappe.info, (de), 2024-09-24
  2. Surveillance now completely secret, nd-aktuell.de, (de), 2024-04-02
  3. Pegasus infections in Togo revealed for the first time, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2024-01-23
  4. State Trojans threaten fundamental rights in the EU, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2024-01-18
  5. Federal Network Agency shuts down pseudonymous mobile connections, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2024-01-08
  6. Attackers can disconnect 714 smartphone models from the 5G network, golem.de, (de), 2023-12-09
  7. Researchers: Security gaps in roaming remain a major threat even with 5G, heise.de, (de), 2023-10-27
  8. Stealth: Mobile phone providers once again illegally passed on data to Schufa, tarnkappe.info, (de), 2023-09-16
  9. Russian journalist in exile hacked with Pegasus, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2023-09-14
  10. Company creates scoring profiles of half of all cell phone users worldwide, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2023-06-27
  11. Authorities ask who owns a phone number every second, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2022-06-21
  12. The 5-G monitoring standards, media.ccc.de, (de), 2019-08-28
  13. 35C3 - The hidden side of mobile communications, media.ccc.de, (de), 2018-12-29
  14. Interactive card: mandatory registration for prepaid SIM cards widespread in Europe, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2017-08-02
  15. The end of anonymity, sueddeutsche.de, (de), 2017-07-11
  16. Computer science expertise: One phone number is enough to hit a person with a drone missile, netzpolitik.org, (de), 2016-09-20
  17. SS7: Locate. Track. Manipulate, media.ccc.de, (en), 2014-12-28
  18. Frequently asked questions: General and SINA connection, bundesnetzagentur.de, (de)
  19. Was ist RRLP?, wikipedia.org, (en)